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Structuring Correctional Decision Making:
A Traditional Proposalt

W. Anthony Fitch* and Julian Tepper**

Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of discretion
may mean either beneficience or tyranny, either justice or injustice,
either reasonableness or arbitrariness.
A startlingly high proportion of all official discretionary action
pertaining to administration of justice is illegal or of doubtful
legality.'
Historically, the development of the law governing crime and punishment
has evinced a continuing tug of war between certainty and flexibility. The
need for both is obvious. On the one hand, the citizenry needs to know the
types of conduct which will subject it to governmental intervention, and the
government needs to know the kinds of intervention which are violative of
individual rights. On the other hand, the mechanisms which implement and
enforce the law must allow for the exercise of judgment necessary to "adjust"
the law and, thereby, avoid a diminution in the consent of the people to be
governed.
In one sense, the criminal justice system is a system of flexibility. The
various agents of the government-police, prosecution, courts, and cor" Parts of this article are based on an inter-office memorandum, dated June 14,
1971, on file at the NLADA National Law Office, Washington, D.C.
The views expressed herein are entirely those of the authors and do not reflect the
position of any organization with which they are associated. The assistance of
Howard Feinstein, NLADA National Law Office, is gratefully acknowledged.
* A.B., Princeton University, 1966; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1969; Member,
District of Columbia Bar; Director, College of William & Mary Metropolitan Criminal
Justice Center, and Adjunct Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College
of William and Mary.
** B.A., University of Maryland, 1962; J.D., Columbia University School of Law,
1965; Diploma in Criminology, Cambridge University, 1968; Member, New York
and District of Columbia Bars; Director, National Law Office, National Legal Aid and
Defender Association; Executive Director, Neighborhood Legal Services Program,
Washington, D.C.
1. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3, 12 (1971 ed.)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
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rections-have almost unlimited discretion, statutory provisions notwithstanding, in choosing whether or not to arrest, prosecute, convict, imprison,
or release from prison. While such discretion, no doubt, often serves to
enhance traditional notions of justice, it has other, less desirable results, not
the least of which is the obvious and lingering discriminatory application of
the law on the bases of wealth and race.
It is almost axiomatic that a governmental agency is allowed as much discretion as it can handle; that is, until it abuses such discretion so often or so
flagrantly that, in a final sense of despair, another branch of the government
cuts it off.
As we will demonstrate below, the penal agencies have been provided
with unbridled discretion by the legislatures which have created them. There
are many reasons for this, not the least of which Fletcher Knebel has defined
as the second rule of politics: namely, that a politician must do whatever is
necessary to get re-elected. (Knebel's first rule, of course, is that the second
takes precedence over all others.)
Discretion is nothing less than uncontrolled power. Whether or not
power becomes abusive or corrupt depends upon the relationship between
the entity which possesses and the persons who are subject to such power.
No one could convincingly assert that the penal system's concern for the future welfare ("success") of its clients at all resembles that of the parent
for the child. Whether or not this disparity has anything of significance to
tell us, each passing day has produced additional evidence sufficient now to
convince most of us that penal agencies have not chosen to exercise their
discretionary powers in a manner calculated to protect the health and welfare
of persons entrusted to their care.
One final introductory observation: The public, more than ever aware of
the failure of the criminal justice system to "correct" the future behavior of
offenders, has begun to focus upon and locate much of the blame within
the penal system. The extent to which this may or may not be valid is a
proper subject for analysis. However, the penal system's lack of measurable
utility in terms of crime prevention must significantly weigh upon any consideration of whether or not we wish to continue the latitude which we have
granted it, a latitude which has resulted in the degradation and, in many
cases, the destruction of the prison inmate.
To better understand the dynamics of discretion, we have examined the
legislative schemes of the federal and District of Columbia governments and of
twelve states: California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.
Chief among selection factors was the conclusion that these jurisdictions are
leaders in either or both correctional innovation and legislative productivity.
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Not unexpectedly, we found virtual legislative abdication in favor of almost
total administrative discretion. Modestly, we set forth a traditional corrective
approach: subject the administrative agency to appropriate and recognized
administrative procedures.
1. An Overview of CorrectionalLegislation
A.

GeneralAuthority

Each of the statutes reviewed delegates to the department of corrections
or to the director of the department general authority over the supervision
and management of the state's correctional system. Except for the requirement that rules and orders be kept in writing and by implication, collected in
one corpus for use and reference, the provisions that follow are typical.
The Department shall make and enforce all such general rules,
regulations, and orders for the government and discipline of the
penitentiary as it may deem expedient, and may, from time to time,
alter and amend the same; and in making such rules and regulations it shall, in connection with the Governor, adopt such as in its
judgment, while being consistent with the discipline of the penitentiary, shall best conduce to the reformation of the convicts ....
The Department of Public Safety shall exercise a general supervision over the government, discipline and police regulations of the
penitentiary, in accordance with the orders, rules and regulations
established by it . . . . Such rules and orders shall be in writing
and shall be kept by the Department for that purpose, 2 and shall be
subject to alteration or amendment by the Department.
Policy matters such as "government," "discipline," "reformation," and "police
regulations of the penitentiary"-inevitably the concern of any prison administration-are set forth in the most general terms, without standards, criteria,
or guidelines for the substantive content of the system's regulations which
must implement them. This vagueness and generality might present no
problem if there were additional provisions dealing with management of
the institution and its inmates to fill the void.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE 39 5058, 6104, 6204, 6252 (West 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN.
9H 944.09, 944.14, 945.21 (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 27, § 1 (Supp. 1973);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 791.206 (1968); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 112.157 (McKinney
1968) as amended, (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:1-12 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 61, § 301 (1964); TEXAs PENAL CODE art. 6166j (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§ 102(c) (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. H3 72.08.102, 72.08.120, 72.12.170,
72.13.170 (Supp. 1972); STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIoNs ACT § 3(d) (1971) (Advisory Committee Intergovernmental Relations) [hereinafter cited as STATE DEPARTMENT ACT]; Standard Act for State Correctional Services § 6 (1966) (National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, with the American Correctional Association) [hereinafter
cited as State Correctional Services Act]; MODEL PENAL CODE § 401.2(e) (1962).
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Treatment of Prisoners

Several statutes have equally general provisions regarding the basic conditions under which prisoners may be incarcerated. Parts of the Massachusetts
and Washington Codes are representative of the older provisions. Section
32 of the Massachusetts Code provides that prisoners shall be treated with
the "kindness which [they]

. .

.merit;"'3 a statute from the State of Washing-

ton dating from 1891 provides that prisoners shall be given a "bed of straw
or other suitable material

. . .

and shall be supplied with garments of

coarse, substantial material of distinctive manufacture . . . . 4 Other codes
require that all prisoners or certain groups of prisoners (such as those segregated or isolated for disciplinary reasons) be housed in facilities with adequate lights, ventilation, and sanitary equipment. 5 Conspicuously absent
are directives for or controls over the day-to-day administration of conditions
in correctional institutions. The recent flood of judicial decisions finding
living conditions in institutions or sections thereof to be far below minimum
constitutional levels underscores the inefficacy of current statutes. 6
C.

Discipline

It has already been pointed out that nearly every statute includes "discipline"
among the matters which departments and/or directors are authorized to
regulate. 7 The Washington statute is unique in providing that "the discipline
imposed [in the state reformatory, as opposed to the state penitentiary] shall
be reformatory in character." Nor surprisingly, the Washington Code provides no further guidance as to how disciplinary measures should be imposed
to reform or rehabilitate inmates. Yet this is an issue which is basic to the
role of correctional institutions and the means by which their purpose or purposes should be achieved. Past correctional failures amply demonstrate that
no one, including correctional authorities, has all, if any, of the answers.
3. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 127, § 32 (1966).
4. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 72.08.100 (1962).
5. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 401 (1966); N.Y. CORRECTION LAW § 137
(6) (McKinney Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 101 (1964).
6. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2nd Cir. 1967), af 'd, 460 F.2d 126 (2nd
Cir. 1972); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Holt v. Sarner,
300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D.Ark. 1969), 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Mitzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Hamilton

v. Lore, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne
County Board of Commissioners, C.A. No. 173-217 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich.
1971); Bryant v. Hendrick, 208 A.2d 110 (1971); Inmates of the Boys Training School
v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93,
330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971) a! 'd sub nom.
7. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
8. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 72.12.070 (1962).
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Such issues as the appropriate type and degree of disciplinary sanctions require and deserve input from every party interested in or affected by correctional practices.
Only one of the state statutes surveyed has any provisions to govern the
aspect of disciplinary practices which most concern inmates and others in
the prisoner rights/prison reform movement-the process by which infractions and sanctions are decided. 9 Inmates, their representatives and spokesmen have taken the essentially conservative position that many of the abuses
which they have alleged can be prevented through the establishment and observance of the basic attributes of procedural due process-notice, impartial disciplinary hearing boards, confrontation and cross-examination of accusers and adverse witnesses, assistance and representation. At the very
least, much of the prisoner litigation of the past few years could have been
avoided if legislatures had either specified disciplinary hearing procedures'O
or required their correctional departments to establish hearing procedures
encompassing these basic protections.
Several statutes contain one or two other provisions dealing with inmate discipline. The Massachusetts Code, for example, contains two
sections establishing basic standards for the use of segregation and isolation
units. Section 39 of the correctional chapter provides that inmates housed
in segregation units-as a result of what prison authorities frequently call
administrative segregation decisions-shall be furnished regular meals, fully
furnished cells, limited recreational facilities, certain visits and communication between them and authorized officials, and periodic medical and psychiatric examinations." For isolation units, section 40 requires light, ventilation,
adequate sanitary facilities, and at least one full meal each day. Unlike other
statutes, the section also establishes a 15-day maximum period of confinement in isolation for each offense. 12 Legislation such as this establishes
minimum standards which should give the administrator guidance as to the
state's policy toward the use of such easily abused sanctions of the institution
9. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 852-53 (Supp. 1972); Cf. STATE DEPARTMENT ACT
§ 9(e); State Correctional Services Act 16 (both requiring the distribution of copies
of the disciplinary rules to inmates); MODEL PENAL CODE § 304.7(2)

(requiring no-

tice and a hearing by a committee which renders an advisory, non-binding recommendation to the warden, and establishing a rudimentary schedule of sanctions based
on the seriousness of the disciplinary infraction); and the Model Act for the Protection of the Rights of Prisoners § 4 (1972) '(published rules, schedule of sanctions, and
rights to counsel if loss of good time is possible).
10. W. Fitch & J. Tepper, An Introduction to Prison Reform, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE

REv. 627 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fitch &Tepper].
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 39 (1966); Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 304.7
(3); and Model Act for the Protection of the Rights of Prisoners §§ 3(d), (e).
12. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 127, § 40 (1966); See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§ 853(a)(1) (Supp. 1972).
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and provides helpful direction for the development of more detailed regulations. Nevertheless, although preferable to the complete absence of guidelines regarding the use of segregation and isolation which characterizes most
correctional codes, even these two sections provide only limited guidance.
They deal with some matters in great detail-for example, the limit of fifteen
days on confinement in isolation-but establish no standards in other equally
important areas-for example, when the isolation sanction may be utilized.
More appropriate and more concise legislation could expressly state general
standards to be implemented by specific rules and regulations established by
the institution or department.
The second type of statute relating to the disciplining of prisoners is, to
our knowledge, never subject to criticism for excessive specificity. Almost
every statute and approximately two-thirds of all correctional codes13 surveyed authorize "good time," "gain time," "commutation of sentence," or
"reduction of sentence."' 1 4 The purpose of such provisions is to stimulate
good behavior within the institution or to deter misconduct. Under these
sections a prisoner is credited with an additional number of days toward
the completion of his sentence for each period of time (usually a month)
in which he is not involved in an infraction of the institution's disciplinary rules. The reduction schedule is usually established by statute 15
and based upon either the length of the original sentence or the length
of time for which the inmate has been imprisoned. Accrued good time
may be forfeited or future good time withheld as a sanction; 16 thus, such
provisions are intimately related to the disciplinary system of each institution. Because good-time adjustments can substantially decrease or
increase a prisoner's sentence, good-time decisions occupy a central place
in prison life. Here again, the importance of developing satisfactory regulations and standards for the administration of good-time decisions is underscored by the numerous recent decisions invalidating disciplinary sanctionsincluding loss of good-time-imposed through informal, unfair, or non7
existent disciplinary procedures.1
13.

Singleton v. Shafer, 313 F. Supp. 1094, 1096 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

FLA. STAT. ANN. §
947.27, expired (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108, § 45 (Supp. 1973); MASS. GEN.LAWS
ANN. ch. 127, 129 (1966); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.33 (1968); MINN. STAT.
'ANN. § 243.18 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-140 (1964); N.Y. CORREC. LAW

14. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2920, 2923, 2924 (West 1970);

§§ 803, 804 (McKinney 1968); TEX. PENAL CODE art. 6166 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 28, § 811 (Supp. 1972); STATE DEPARTMENT AcT § 11(a); State Correctional
Services Act § 19.
15. Some statutes delegate the establishment of the rate of reduction to the director. N.Y. CoRuEc. LAW § 803, 804 (McKinney 1968). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108,
§ 45 (1952).
16. See notes 14 and 15, supra.
17. See, e.g., Morris v. Travisino, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970); Clutchette v,
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Visitors

Correctional codes commonly provide for unrestricted visits by various state
and federal officials to the state's correctional institutions for the purpose
of inspecting conditions therein. 18 A few statutes also authorize private,
unmonitored conversations between such officials and inmates, 19 and protect
the right of prisoners to confer with attorneys, 20 although these rarely establish the right of private consultations. 21 Other potential visitors are required to obtain permission from the superintendent of the institution or from
some departmental office pursuant to rules and regulations established by
the director.

The following persons shall be authorized to visit at pleasure
all correctional facilities: The governor and lieutenant-governor,
commissioner of general services, secretary of state, comptroller
and attorney-general, members of the commission of correction,
members of the legislature, judges of the court of appeals, supreme
court and county judges, district attorneys and every minister of
the gospel having charge of a congregation in the town wherein
any such facility is situated. No other person not otherwise authorized by law shall be permitted to enter a correctional facility
except by authority of the commissioner shall prescribe. The
provisions of this section shall not apply to such portion of a
correctional facility in which inmates under sentence of death are
22
confined.
Such a statute, except for the failure to establish firmly the right of private
attorney-client consultation, provides a minimally adequate foundation for
the development by the institution of requisite visiting regulations. The
legislature is properly not interested in the particular provisions and schedules made for visiting, although it would be preferable for the legislature to
express a policy, for example, of the fullest possible visiting arrangements
Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Landman v. Royster, 353 F. Supp. 621
(Va. 1971).
18. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.23 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108, § 117 (Supp. 1973);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 36 (1966); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 800.19,
800.52 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.58 (1972); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 146
(McKinney 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:1-2(h) (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61,
§§ 53, 55 (1964); TEX. PENAL CODE art. 6166, § 2 (1970); Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE

§§ 401.10, 401.11(5); Model Act for the Protection of the Rights of Prisoners § 7.
19. TEX. PENAL CODE art. 6166, § 2 (1970); Model Act for the Protection of the
Rights of Prisoners 7, (by implication).
20. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 804 (Supp. 1972).
21. But see MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 127, § 36 (1970); Model Act for the Protection of the Rights of Prisoners § 7..
22. N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 146 (McKinney 1968); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
944.23 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.48 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 53
(1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 800.52, 800.53 (1968); TEX. PENAL CODE

art. 6166, § 2 (1970); STATE DEPARTMENT ACT § 9(C).
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between inmates and their families and in favor of private visits for some
or all classes of inmates.
E. Correspondenceand Reading Material
Several statutes provide for the mailing of sealed letters from inmates to such
state officials as the director of the department, the Attorney-General, the
Governor, or members of the legislature. 23 Institutional regulations in other
states have been amended to establish the same right. 24 Most statutes are
silent as to other correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, and to incoming books, magazines, and newspapers. 25 Prison authorities have always
censored mail with or without express authorization, 26 presumably under
the statutory grant of general authority over institutional affairs. Other
statutes expressly direct the department or institutional superintendents to establish regulations regarding mail and reading material.2 7 At least one state,
California, has a provision establishing certain minimal standards for the
censoring of incoming material, 2s but whether they are being observed is unclear. 29 It would seem easy enough, as we have suggested elsewhere, 30
for legislatures to establish short, specific statutes comprehensively dealing with prison processing of mail and reading material. The importance of
correspondence privileges to the exercise of other constitutional rights, the almost universal tendency of prison administrators to over-regulate correspondence, and the large number of court decisions protecting the First
Amendment rights of correspondence against such over-regulation, 31 also
23.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600(2)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §

§ 87 (1966);

(West 1970); MASS.
802(b) (Supp. 1972).

GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 127,

24. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement No. 7300.2A (1967); Wisconsin
Correctional Institute, Information Handbook, 5; Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections,
Administrative Directive #14,
1; Washington Department of Institutions, Office of
Adult Corrections, Memorandum #70-5, 2.
25. An exception is PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 383 (1964) which authorizes the receipt of daily newspapers, subject to approval, for which no criteria are established.
26. A concise summary of prison mail censorship practices is provided by Singer,
Censorship of Prisoners' Mail and the Constitution, 56 A.B.A.J. 1051, 1053 (1970).
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 945.21(j) (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 802 (Supp.
1972).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600(4) (West 1970).
29. Director's Rule 2402.12 of the California Department of Corrections provides
only that inmates "may subscribe to newspapers and periodicals unless disapproved
by the institution. These must come directly from the publisher." This grant of
totally discretionary authority does not seem to adhere to the basic guidelines established by § 2600(4), n.28, supra.
30. Fitch & Tepper 627.
31. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462
F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1972); Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972), aff'g 328
F. Supp. 162 (D. Me. 1971); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D. R.I.
1970); Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Fortune Society v.. McGinnis,
319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); and cases cited therein.
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argue for unusually high legislative specificity in this area. In the face of a
legislative preference to continue to delegate generally, rather than to deal at
the desirable level of specificity, even a broadly stated policy in favor of minimal restrictions on correspondence, together with a statutory requirement for
the establishment of a hearing procedure for the review of any decisions to
censor,3 2 would greatly improve the present situation of almost universally
unfettered discretion. Faced with such legislative guidelines, a correctional
department would almost certainly be forced to adopt minimally restrictive
standards and fair procedures, especially if required to justify its proposed
rules and regulations publicly.
F. Standards for CorrectionalFacilities
Some statutes surveyed for this article establish minimal requirements for
jails, juvenile facilities, and other penal facilities under the jurisdiction of local units of government.33 Alternatively, some states have authorized their
departments of adult corrections or other bodies to establish standards
which local facilities must meet and/or to license some systems or types of
facilities.3 4 The development and promulgation of such standards is too
time-consuming and often too complicated and controversial for the legislative process; legislatures quite properly delegate such functions to more specialized and expert bodies. 35 In the area of licensing and establishing standards, the decisions of such bodies can nevertheless have the same substantial impact on both the local jurisdictions and the potential inmates or clients
as legislative or judicial decisions. Both the difficulty and the importance of these decisions demand that local public officials, professionals
in the correctional fields, and other interested parties participate in the
development of the required standards. A recent California statute directing the State Board of Corrections to establish, and thereafter biennially
review, minimum standards for local detention facilities provides a basically
adequate model insofar as it requires the Board to "seek the advice of...
the Department of Corrections, the Department of Youth Authority, local juvenile justice commission, local correction officials, experts in criminology and
32. Cf. Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 72.08.380 (1962); Guajardo v. McAdams, C.A. No. 71-H-570, 72-H-64 (S.D. Tex.,
Sept. 25, 1971).
33. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 950, 951 (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 126,
§§ 4, 5, 12, 16-39 (1966); Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 241, 242 (1972).
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 6030 (West 1970); N.Y. CORREC. LAw § 46.7-a (McKinney 1968); STATE DEPARTMENT AcT § 4(c)(2); State Correctional Services Act § 3

(3).

35. Cf. DAvis 41, 46-50.
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penology, and other interested persons."36 A better provision would require such boards to conduct at least some public hearings and to publish
proposed standards for comment, further public hearing or both. Such
a procedure could easily be conducted under the rule-making procedures of
most administrative procedure acts, utilizing the state's equivalent of the
7
Federal Register to publish the standards in proposed and final form.3
G.

Classification

Most statutes now reflect the standard correctional theory of classifying inmates by some combination of age, sentence, offense, or likelihood of
rehabilitation, for purposes of housing, work assignments, and other institutional programs. The Texas provision, contained in the section prescribing the director's general authority, is typical:
The manager, with the consent of the Texas Board of Corrections,
shall have power . . . to make provisions for the separation and
classification of prisoners according to sex, color, age, health, cor-38
rigibility, and character of offense ....
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 6030 (West 1970) reads:
Local detention facilities; establishment of standards
(a)

The Board of Corrections . . . shall establish minimum standards . . .

for local . . . detention facilities by July 1, 1972. The Board of Corrections
shall review such standards biennially and make any appropriate revisions.
(b) The standards shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
health and sanitary conditions, fire and life safety, security, rehabilitation programs, recreation, treatment of persons confined in local detention facilities,
and personnel training.
(c) In establishing minimum standards, the Board of Corrections shall seek
the advise of the following:
(1) For health and sanitary conditions:
The State Department of Public Health, physicians, psychiatrists, local
public health officials and other interested persons.
(2) For fire and life safety:
The State Fire Marshal, local fire officials, and other interested persons.
(3) For security, rehabilitation programs, recreation, and treatment of persons confined in local detention facilities:
The Department of Corrections, the Department of the Youth Authority,
local juvenile justice commissions, local correction officials, experts in criminology and penology, and other interested persons.
(4) For personnel training:
The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, psychiatrists,
experts in criminology and penology, the Department of Corrections, the
Department of Youth Authority, local correctional officials, and other interested persons.
37. 44 U.S.C. § 1501-1511 (1970).
38. TEx. PENAL CODE art. 6166(j) (1970). See also, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 945.081
(1973); N.Y. ConREc. LAW § 70, 137 (McKinney Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 72.13.160 (1962); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.264 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 28, § 102(c) (Supp. 1972); State Department Act, § 7; State Correctional Services
Act § 13.
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This is the extent of the legislative guidance regarding classification in any of
the statutes surveyed.
Now considered an essential first step in any rehabilitation process, classification at some level is and always has been the core of institutional management and, from the inmate's point of view, of institutional life. In this
respect it occupies much the same position as that of institutional discipline.
Indeed, the two are closely related; many of the same dispositions can be imposed in both the disciplinary and the classification process.8 9 It is no coincidence that these two decision-making processes, although theoretically at
opposite ends of the treatment-punishment continuum, are accorded equally
vague and brief attention in the legislation and are, in our experience,
the subject of equally intensive bitterness on the part of prisoners. Yet
here again, it is unrealistic to expect the legislature to make complicated
decisions regarding even basic classification categories, beyond perhaps the
establishment of two or three basic types of institutions. 40 These decisions
and the classification of particular inmates must be made by the correctional
authorities just as decisions of an equally comprehensive and diverse na-

ture are made, for example, by federal and local welfare officials.

The

former, of course, make their decisions pursuant to detailed, highly compli-

cated but nevertheless publicly debated and published regulations adopted
through the traditional administrative process. 41 There is no reason why
the similar correctional classification decisions cannot be made through
similar procedures.

H. Transfers
One important aspect of the authority to classify is the authority to assign
and re-assign prisoners to particular institutions or to various parts of institutions. Nearly every state and federal correctional code authorizes the director to "transfer persons confined in one state prison institution, or facil-

ity of the Department of Corrections to another. ' 42 Such authority is clearly
a necessary and proper adjunct of correctional administration. Nevertheless many inmates allege that the transfer power is abused; the records of
39. See Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D. R.I. 1970).
40. The United States, for example, has established a separate correctional system
for "youth offenders" aged 18-26, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1970).
41. See 45 C.F.R., subtitle B.
42. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 5080, 6127 (authority for transfer to Medical Correction
Facility at Vacaville), 2049.2 (West 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 945.09 (1973); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 108, § 110 (Supp. 1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, §§ 97, 97A,
115 (1966); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.265 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.07
(1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-85 (1964); N.Y. CORfEC. LAW. § 23 (McKinney Supp.
1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §§ 72, 933 (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §

102(b),

702 (Supp. 1972); State Department Act § 6(a); State Correctional Services Act § 11.
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some of our clients and correspondents seem to justify these allegations. The
inmates charge that intra- and inter-institutional transfers are made on the
basis of unspecified beliefs that the inmates have violated institutional regulations or present a threat to institutional security. 43 At the very least,
transfers from one institution to another within a large state, or from one
state system to another pursuant to interstate compacts, or between widely
separated federal institutions, all constitute severe deprivations equal to the
harshest disciplinary sanctions.
Two statutes among those surveyed have or had provisions which may or
did protect inmates from apparently arbitrary transfers. The Pennsylvania
Code authorizes transfers only upon the consent of a Court of Common Pleas,
although the statute does not provide for a hearing on the transfer. 44 The
Vermont Correctional Code formerly authorized the transfer of prisoners between the penitentary and the house of corrections only with the inmate's
consent; but this provision was repealed in 1972.45 Each of these statutes
may inconvenience or hamper prison administrators. A solution which
would probably be more amenable to administrators and to inmates would
be a statutory requirement that correctional systems develop an internal
hearing proceedure to be followed whenever the system proposes to transfer
an inmate from one institution to another. The consent issue raised in the
Vermont statute might be adequately dealt with by a provision that no inmate
shall be transferred without his consent if the transfer is conditioned upon
only a change in rehabilitation program or treatment program. Thus disciplinary and involuntary "administrative" transfers could be handled pursuant
to identical procedures.
I.

Furloughs, Work Release, Half-Way Houses

In recent years, correctional administrators and other students of the correctional field have stressed the need for a greater reliance on "community
corrections. ''4 6 Indeed, the theoretical benefits of work and educational
release programs, furloughs for family visits and job-hunting, and half-way
houses are already becoming accepted correctional dogma. If for no other
reason than lack of experience with such programs, the new statutes authorizing temporary release are general in nature. For example, the New York
statute provides that:
43. Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D. N.J. 1971); Barringer v. Kleindienst,
Civil No. 933-72 (D. D.C. 1972).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 72 (Supp. 1972).
45. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 255 (1970), repealed in 1972.
46. PRESMENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRAT1ON OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 165-171 (1967); Burdman,
Realism for Community Based Correctional Services, 381 ANNALS 1 (Jan., 1969).
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The commissioner shall promulgate rules and regulations consistent with the provisions of this article for the administration of
temporary release programs, and shall appoint or cause to
be ap47
pointed a temporary release committee for each institution.
Yet admission to, arrangements for supervision during, and revocation of assignment to these programs raise the same issues found in any correctional
situation. Indeed some of the issues are even more difficult because of the
added circumstance that a substantial degree of liberty, approaching that of
parolees, is the net effect of these programs. Thus, disciplinary sanctions
can result in an even greater loss of freedom than those imposed on inmates
within an institution. Yet administrators of such programs are usually
authorized to remove participants from the program without any prior
hearing procedure, even in systems that otherwise accord relatively substantial
procedural safeguards in institutional disciplinary actions.
The need for adequate rulemaking procedures as well as adequate substantive content of those rules is as critical from the community's point of
view as from the inmates'. Proposals to establish furlough programs, work
release programs and especially half-way houses often raise considerable
community interest, usually in the form of fear and opposition. Regardless
of our personal opinion of these reactions, we have no doubt that the community at large and especially potentially affected neighborhoods should be
informed of and involved in the planning of community corrections programs. The administrative rule-making process, particularly where hearings
are used, again seems appropriate for this purpose.
J. Parole
In many respects the temporary release programs constitute preliminary
or truncated parole situations. Like the parolee, the inmate's life and program
revolves around the community; unlike the parolee, he must return to either
the correctional institution or to his half-way house every night, instead of
periodically reporting to a parole officer. Indeed the various temporary
release programs, pursuant either to statutory direction or departmental policy, are frequently used as an intermediate step to prepare the inmate for
life in the community as a parolee.
Most correctional statutes either include or are accompanied by acts governing the granting, conditions, and revocation of parole. The acts commonly provide for some type of brief hearing or interview between the pa47. N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 852 (McKinney Supp. 1973); Cf. N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 632
(McKinney Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.3 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:491, 3j; 30:4-91, 6j (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 102, 753 (Supp. 1972); STATE DEPARTMENT

ACT, §§ 9(d), 10(d);

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 304.9.
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rolee and a parole board or commission before parole may be granted, 48
but this is by no means universal. We believe that there are strong constitutional and operational arguments for the conduct of full hearings, including the participation of counsel prior to the granting or denying of parole. But there is definitely more than one side to this issue. 49 Whether
these important questions are best decided at the legislative or administrative level is a close question. Regardless of the final resolution of the
merits of the substantive question, it is one deserving input from various
concerned parties rather than merely the paroling authorities who, under
most statutes, are authorized to establish their own rules.5 0 It is also customary for parole boards to grant or deny parole without announcing the reason for those decisions 5' and to base those decisions on unpublished and
probably non-existent standards and criteria. 52 Corrections and criminology authorities know far too little to be able to accurately predict parolee behavior.5 3 This, however, is not less, but more reason for a parole board
to articulate the factors it utilizes, and for participation by others in the
process of developing relevant criteria.
Parole boards have equally sweeping authority in establishing the conditions by which parolees must abide, although several recent court decisions
have begun to expose and probably restrain some of the abuses.5 4 It is likely
that other unfair, unrealistic, and even unconstitutional conditions would
not be established were the general parole conditions and the range of possible specific conditions adopted only after public discussion.
Many of the issues in the parole revocation process have recently been resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer,55 where
48. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.17 (1973) (hearing at discretion of parole commission); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 134 (1966); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
791.234, 791.235 (1968); N.Y. CORREc. LAW § 214 (McKinney 1968); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, § 502 (Supp. 1972); Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 243.05, 243.06 (1972);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-123.18 (1964).
49. Serd, A. Parole Apologia, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 98 (1968); Note, Due Process:
The Right to Counsel in ParoleRelease Hearings, 54 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1968).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5076.1 (West 1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108, § 204 (Supp.
1973); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 791.233 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-123.6
(1964); N.Y. CoRREc. LAW § 6-c (McKinney Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61
§§ 301, 331.22, 331.23 (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 503 (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.95.150 (Supp. 1972). See DAVIS, note 110 infra.
51. See Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193
(1971); see DAVIs, note 110, infra.
52. See DAvis, note 110 infra.
53. It is the authors' understanding that the United States Parole Board is now
participating in a major study of parole prediction factors.
54. Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Hyland v. Procunier, 311
F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1970); People v. Dominquez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 290 (1967).
55. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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the Court found that due process of law encompasses substantial procedural
rights in the parole revocation process. The only important revocation issue
left unresolved by the Court is the question of the right to representation by
counsel in such proceedings.

If anything, the Court's decision resulted in a

more complicated, two-stage hearing process than probably would have
resulted from any kind of rule-making procedure followed by the adoption of
a rational revocation proceeding; such an administrative process may well
have avoided the adjudication in Morrissey. Similar litigation is likely to be
the ultimate resolution of the granting and condition issues if the past neglect.
intransigence, sloppiness or paranoia similar to that exhibited by the paroling
authority in Morrissey are not corrected in the immediate future, 56 an
event which does not seem very likely thus far.
K.

The FederalStatute

The statute governing the United States Bureau of Prisons is shorter and
more general than the typical state statute.
The control and management of Federal penal and correctional
institutions . .

.

. [is] vested in the Attorney General who shall

promulgate rules for the government thereof ...
The Attorney General may establish and conduct industries,
farms, and other activities and classify
the inmates; and provide for
57
their rehabilitation, and reformation.
The Attorney General is authorized to appoint a Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, 8 and the Bureau is charged with the management and regulation
of the federal penal system under the Attorney General's direction.59 The statute contains a classification section which is probably as specific as can be
found anywhere,6 0 establishes work release programs, community treatment facilities, and furloughs, 6' and authorizes the Attorney General "at
56. Cf. Holland v. Oliver, 350 F. Supp. 485, 487 (E.D. Va., 1972): ". . . Mhis
Court does not act as a prison review agency and cannot upset those decisions of
prison boards which have followed all procedures required by the due process clause
unless they are arbitrary or capricious."
57. 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1970).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 4041 (1970).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1970)..
60. 18 U.S.C. § 4081 provides:
The Federal penal and correctional institutions shall be so planned and
limited in size as to facilitate the development of an integrated system which
will assure the proper classification and segregation of Federal prisoners according to the nature of the offenses committed, the character and mental
condition of the prisoners, and such other factors as should be considered in
providing an individualized system of discipline, care, and treatment of the
persons committed to such institutions.

61. 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1970).
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'62
any time to transfer a person from one place of confinement to another.
Good time is allowed to all prisoners, 63 and a prisoner may earn additional
good time for work within his institution and for "exceptionally meritorious
service." '64 The statute contains the standard provisions regarding parole
release, conditions, and revocation, 65 and is silent on the treatment and
disciplining of prisoners, visits, and correspondence.

L.

The District of Columbia Statute

The District of Columbia Department of Corrections
under the general direction and supervision of the Commissioners of
the District of Columbia shall have charge of the management and
regulation of [several institutions] . . . and be responsible for the

safekeeping, care, protection, instruction, and discipline of all
persons committed to such institution. The Department of Corrections with the approval of the Commissioners shall have power
to promulgate rules and regulations for the government of such
institutions and to establish and conduct industries, farms, and
other activities, to classify the inmates, and to provide for their
proper treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformation. 6
Work release programs 67 and good time deductions68 are authorized, and a
District of Columbia Board of Parole69 is established. The United States
Attorney General is authorized to transfer prisoners in D.C. institutions to
other federal facilities, 70 a process which is usually initiated by the D.C. Department of Corrections. 71 Like the Federal statute, the D.C. Code does
not address the treatment and disciplining of prisoners, visits, or correspondence.
II.

Meeting the Problem of Statutory Vagueness

The foregoing survey and discussion demonstrate, we believe, that the statutes governing correctional endeavors in this country are extremely vague.
This holds true even though the survey focused on jurisdictions generally considered leaders in the overall legislative process in terms of resources (annual
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
(Supp.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1970).
18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1970).
18 U.S.C. § 4162 (1970).
18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4210 (1970).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-442 (1967) as amended D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-442
V, 1972).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-461 (1967).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-405 (1967).
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-201(a) to 208 (1967).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-425 (1967); 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1970).
See, e.g., Barringer v. Kleindienst, Civil No. 933-72 (D.D.C. 1972).
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sessions, committee staffs and other research assistance, legislative drafting
services, etc.) and legislative product. The image that repeatedly emerges
is a void, a tabula rasa; the legislatures have provided correctional administrators almost no guidance on the various management and program issues
which they must resolve every day. More fundamentally, the various legislatures have rarely established at even the crudest levels (deterrence, rehabilitation, preventive confinement, or punishment; education, work, or jobtraining) the basic thrusts of the system. The best that can be said of the
statutes is that they are a potpourri of ideas, fears, fads, prejudices, guesses,
bewilderment, despair and unconcern.
As we have seen, the correctional system quite naturally, has filled the
legislative void with its own policies, rules, standards and traditions. Frequently, these practices have been basically self-protective and violative of
basic constitutional guarantees and counter-productive to the achievement
of any correctional goals except humiliation, degradation and possibly punishment.
We have suggested in this article and elsewhere that some of the statutory
ambiguity and vagueness can be reduced through legislative revision, and
have developed models based on one set of assumptions; 72 the technical aspects are not particularly difficult. Other issues are just not suitable for resolution by our legislatures for various reasons.7 3 Many others fall somewhere in the middle of this "legislative reform possibility-impossibility" spectrum.
The traditional response to insufficient legislative guidance and uncontrolled administrative practices has been the establishment of standard procedures to which administrative agencies must adhere in the performance of their several basic functions.74 We are not students of the administrative process, and we assume that the claims of the fundamental importance and benefits of administrative law and regulation are justified. 75 In72. Fitch & Tepper 627.
73. See note 35, supra.
74. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1970); see also legislative history cited in note
80 in!ra.
75. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1954):
There was more or less agreement as to the significance of the administrative
process between those who hailed it and whose who hated it. It was seen
with hope by the one and with fear by the other as capable of working continually progressive modification . . . . mhe administrative movement . . .
has profoundly changed our society, a change which can be set down beside
the English Reform Movement of the nineteenth century as one of the great
historical jobs of law-making.
(Professor Jaffe goes on to discuss the problems as well as the benefits resulting from
the administrative process).
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deed, despite our limited expertise in this area, we venture to say that the
major difficulty in fully implementing administrative law theory has been
operational, not conceptual. The purposes of administrative procedure
acts have been most completely realized when the affected agencies have
felt confident enough to actually attempt to achieve them. 76 We do not
delude ourselves that all correctional agencies-particularly in light of a history of general failure due in part, perhaps, to inadequate resources and
all-too-frequent abuses-would welcome and support procedure aimed at
openness, public input, structure, reviewability, and accountability. 77 Nevertheless, we take the very simple position that correctional agencies should
be and are subject to the administrative procedure acts now operative in most
jurisdictions. 78 We propose in the remainder of this article to explore the
soundness and the implications of this hypothesis with respect to the
United States Bureau of Prisons and the District of Columbia Department of
Corrections, emphasizing the latter primarily because of our personal knowledge of the basic strength and potential of that department.
A.

The FederalSituation

The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines "agency" as:
. . . each authority of the Government of the United States, whether
or not it is within or subject to review by another agency. .... 79
Neither the Act, nor its legislative history specifies which administrative agencies are subject to the Act. The legislative history, however, contains language strongly indicating that the Act was intended to have the widest possible coverage.
The bill is meant to be operative "across the board" in accordance with its terms, or not at all. Where one agency has been able
to demonstrate that it should be exempted, all like agencies have
been exempted in general terms. (See section 2(a)) .

.

..

No

agency has been favored by special treatment.
[The bill] is 6f course operative according to its terms even if
76. The disappointing inefficacy of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1970) is the most recent example. Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide
and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEXAs L. REV. 1261 (1970).

77. Nor are we unaware of the substantial criticism of various aspects of administrative law and theory. See, e.g.,
trative Policy: Another Look
Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA.
Agencies: A Response to the

Jaffe, supra, n.75; Robinson, The Making of Adminisat Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative
L. REV. 485 (1970); Symposium, Federal Regulatory
Ash Report, 57 VA. L. REV. 923 (1971).
Current

problems with the established administrative agencies do not seem relevant to an area
lacking even the rudiments of standard administrative procedure.
78. See Robinson, note 77 supra.

79. 5 U.S.C. § 551(l) (1970).
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it should cause some administrative inconvenience or changes in
procedure.8 0
On two occasions, the Supreme Court has addressed itself to specific situations involving the issue of the coverage of the Administrative Procedure
Act. In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,"' section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act,8 2 governing administrative adjudications, was held to "cover deportation proceedings conducted by the Immigration Service."'88 Relying
heavily on legislative history and the Act's intent, the Court asserted that
The Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, supra, is
a new, basic and comprehensive regulation of procedures in many
agencies, more than a few of which can advance arguments that its
generalities should not or do not include them. Determination
of questions of its coverage may well be approached through consideration of its purposes as disclosed by its background.8 4
A "background" factor which the Court particularly emphasized was the
"multiplication of federal administrative agencies and expansion of their
functions to include adjudications which have serious impact on private
rights."8" In NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,80 the Court addressed the issue of the NLRB's refusal to abide by the rule-making provisions of the
Act,8 7 and held that a "rule" issued in a prior adjudicatory proceeding not in
compliance with the APA section on rule-making was invalid. A plurality
of the Court stated:
The rule-making provisions of that Act, which the Board would
avoid, were designed to assure fairness and mature consideration
of rules of general application [citations omitted]. They may not
be avoided by the process of making rules in the course of adjudicatory proceedings. There is no warrant in law for the Board to replace the statutory scheme with a rule-making procedure of its
8
own invention.
Several lower federal courts have reached similar conclusions regarding
administrative actions which the government contended were not required
to accord with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. In Hotch
v. United States,8 9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
80. H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); 1958 U.S. Cong. & Adm.
News, XXX.

81. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
82. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
83. 339 U.S. at 51.
84. Id. at 36.
85. Id. at 36-37.
86. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
87. K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 152, 153 (1972); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

88.

6.13 (Supp. 1965).

394 U.S. at 764.

89. 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954).
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the Department of the Interior was bound to comply with the APA in issuing
a fishing regulation. Overturning Hotch's conviction for violation of the regulation, the court noted that all agency rules are required to be published in the
Federal Register 9" and that any rule not so published is invalid. 9 1 In Marcello v. Ahrens,92 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that certain
deportation hearings which a statute established as the "sole and exclusive
93
procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section"
94
were exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act because Section 7(a)
exempts provisions which are expressly provided for by other statutes. 95
The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, 96 ruling that "exemptions from
the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed
in view of the statement in Section 12 of the Act that modifications must be
express." 97 Similarly, in Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States,98 the U.S. Court
of Customs found that the APA applied to the rule-making procedure by
which the Secretary of the Treasury made certain findings under the AntiDumping Act of 1921.19
Because of the growth of this branch of Government, Congress
had become convinced that there should be a simple and standardized plan of administrative procedure. The Administrative
Procedure Act was intended to put such a plan into effect ...
. . . It is evident from a reading of the legislative history of the
Administrative Procedure Act that it was intended to apply generally to all administrative agencies and procedures, except where specific exemptions were made. 10 0
There are no cases dealing directly with the issue of the applicability of
the APA to the Bureau of Prisons. However, the question of the Act's applicability to the United States Parole Board, conceptually and operationally a
closely related office and also a part of the Department of Justice, has been
touched upon in several cases. Early decisions such as Hiatt v. Compagna'0'
and Moore v. Reid' 02 have held that the Federal APA does not govern the
90. 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1510 (1970); 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (1970).
91. 212 F.2d at 281.
92. 212 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1954).
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (1970).
94. 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1970).
95. 212 F.2d at 836.
96. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
97. 349 U.S. at 310.
98. 178 F. Supp. 922 (Cust. Ct. 3rd Div. 1959).
99. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
100. 178 F. Supp. at 926.
101. 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), af'd. by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S.
880 (1950), rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 907 (1950).
102. 142 F. Supp. 481 (D.D.C. 1956), iev'd on other grounds, 246 F.2d 654 (D.C.

Cir. 1957).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 22:774

grant, conditioning, modification or revocation of parole. An important
recent case challenges this conclusion. In Sobell v. Reed, 10 3 the plaintiff contested the constitutionality of the parole board's refusal to allow him to
travel to and participate in certain anti-war demonstrations. 1 04 Jurisdiction
over the action was grounded upon the judicial review procedure of the
Administrative Procedure Act: 10 5
But it is urged that the Board's action is outside the court's power
of review. It would be surprising, and gravely questionable, if
Congress had meant to confer such final authority upon any administrative agency, particularly one that makes no pretense to
learning in constitutional law ....
There is jurisdiction and a "presumption of reviewability embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act" . . . [citation ommitted]
Broadly speaking, agency action attacked on constitutional
grounds "could be immune from judicial review, if ever, only
by the plainest manifestation of congressional intent to that effect."10 6
The United States Department of Justice-the parent agency of both the
Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Board-publishes provisions and regulations
regarding most of its divisions in Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Only three sections of that title relate to the Bureau of Prisons. One sub-part
sets forth the general authority of the Director and the general function of
the Bureau.' 07 Two other sections deal with "Traffic in Contraband Articles
in Federal Penal and Correctional Institutions"'' 08 and "Rewards for Capture
of Escaped Federal Prisoners."' 109
Despite the presumption of the Act's applicability, the lack of any specific
exemption, and the practice of the rest of the Department of Justice, the
Bureau of Prisons does not adhere to the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act. The Bureau, however, like any large bureaucracy, needs to establish
regulations for its governance. The development of a substantial body of rules
known as Bureau of Prisons Policy Statements has been its response to this
need. Since the promulgation of these Policy Statements accords neither with
the Administrative Procedure Act nor with the Federal Register Act, the regulations are invalid. The implications of this conclusion are the same as those
discussed below in regard to the District of Columbia Department of Corrections and the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act.
103. 327 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).

104. Id. at 1295-97.
105. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).

106. 327 F. Supp. at 1301-02.
107. 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.95, 0.96.

108. 28 C.F.R. § 6.1.
109. 28 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-7.5.
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Similarly, despite Sobell and the conclusion by Professor Davis that "the
Administrative Procedure Act [is] clearly applicable to the board," 110 the
Board continues to refuse to adhere to the APA. Indeed, at the present
time, it is defending a suit which contends that the APA is applicable to its
rule-making case-hearing procedures."'
B.

The District of Columbia Situation

The District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act was enacted into law
in late 1968.112 Since that time there has been little litigation defining the
scope of the Act.1 13 Nevertheless, analysis of the Administrative Procedure
110. DAVIS 126-29. Writing in 1969, Professor Davis is extremely critical of the
Board and makes several recommendations which would all naturally ensue from
adherence to the A.P.A.:
An outstanding example of completely unstructured discretionary power that
can and should be at least partially structured is that of the United States
Parole Board ...
The Board has never announced rules, standards, or guides. The most
specific standard is the statutory provision, repeated by the board's regulations, that the board "may in its discretion" release a prisoner on parole if
the board finds "a reasonable probability that such prisoner will live and
remain at liberty without violating the laws" and that "such release is not
incompatible with the welfare of society." The Board has never publicly
stated any substantive principles that guide it in determining the probability
that a prisoner will commit another crime or whether his release will be
compatible with the welfare of society. The Board has not publicly listed
the criteria that are considered. Nor has it even tried to state the characteristics of cases in which parole will obviously be granted or will obviously
be denied. It has not indicated its position with respect to major patterns of
cases that are most frequently recurring.
The board makes no attempt to involve principles through case-to-case adjudication. 47 It does not select specific cases raising basic questions of
policy for especially intensive consideration with a view to creating a useful
precedent ...
The Administrative Procedure Act, fully applicable to the board, provides:
"Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of any written application, petition, or other request of any interested person made in
connection with any agency proceeding. Except in affirming a prior denial
or where the denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a
brief statement of the grounds for denial." Prisoners make written applications for parole. I think that the board's failure to state "grounds" for denying applications is a clear violation of the act. The board has been violating
the act ever since it was enacted in 1946. [Some footnotes omitted]
Of course, for all I know, the board may have a highly developed system
it keeps entirely secret. For instance, it could be especially skillful in handing the few well-publicized prisoners and in calculating political advantages
and disadvantages of various moves. It could have policies that would not
stand the light of day, such as extra caution in paroling a prisoner whose violation of parole would be widely publicized.
111. Novak v. McCune (Civil No. 421-72R (E.D. Va., 1972); appeal pending
sub nom. U.S. Parole Board v. Merhige, No. 72-234 (4th Cir. 1972).
112. Pub. L.90-614 § 2,82 Stat. 1204 (Oct. 21, 1968), D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1501
to 1510 (Supp.V, 1972).
113. See Capitol Hill Restoration v. Zoning Commission, 287 A.2d 101 (D.C.1972);
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Act, of the enabling statutes governing the District of Columbia Department of
Corrections, of the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act, and
of recent related developments in other jurisdictions persuades us that the Department of Corrections is subject to the D.C. Act.
The D.C. Administrative Procedure Act establishes "procedures to be observed by the Commissioner, the Council, and agencies of the District Government in the appliication of laws administered by them, except that this
chapter shall supersede any such law and procedure to the extent of any conflict therewith."' 114 There is no specific indication in the D.C. APA or in
the legislative history that the Department of Corrections is subject to the Act.
One committee report states that "more than 93 administrative governmental
agencies [are] operating in the District",11 5 but fails to list or otherwise
identify any of the agencies to which it refers. The Act distinguishes
between "subordinate agencies" and "independent agencies." A subordinate agency is
any officer, employee, office, department, division, board, commission, or other agency of the government of the District, other
than an independent agency or the Commissioner or the Council, required by law or by the Commissioner or the Council to administer any law or any rule adopted under the authority of a law;116
An "independent agency" is defined as
any agency of the government of the District with respect to which
the Commissioner and the Council are not authorized by law, other
than this chapter, to establish administrative procedures, but does
not include the several
courts of the District and the District of Co17
lumbia Tax Court;"
Pursuant to D. C. Code Ann. § 24-442 (1967) the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections is
. . .under the general direction and supervision of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia.

.

.The Department of Corrections

with the approval of the Commissioners shall have power to promulgate rules and regulations for the government of such institutions.
118

Junghans v. Department of Human Resources of the District of Columbia, 289 A.2d
17 (D.C. 1972).
114. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1501 (Supp. V, 1972).
115. H.R. Rep. No. 202, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1967). Cf. S. Rep. No. 1581,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
116. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502(4) (Supp. V, 1972).
117. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502(5) (Supp. V, 1972).
118. See also, D.C.CODE ANN. § 24-464 (1967):
The Commissioners of the District of Columbia are authorized to promulgate from time to time such rules and regulations as they deem necessary
for the administration by the Department of Corrections of the work release
program.
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Thus, the Department of Corrections would appear to be a "subordinate
agency" under the definition in the Administrative Procedure Act and the
enabling statutes relating to its operations. Moreover, in Fulwood v.
Culmen the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has described the status of the Director of the D.C. Department of Corrections as
"operating under the Commissioners" and "being under the Commissioners." 119 The Court held that the inmate petitioner had the right to seek redress of alleged religious discrimination pursuant to the procedures set forth in
an order of the Commissioners which was applicable to "every official and employee under the supervision of the District Commissioners in any department, agency, or instrumentality .... ,,120
Finally, the District of Columbia Reorganization Plan of 1967 provides that
[The following regulatory and other functions now vested in the
Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia are hereby
transferred to the Council: . . .
(213) Rules and regulations for the government of institutions
under D.C. Code, sec. 24-442;121
In the context of the later D.C. Administrative Procedure Act, these two developments, it seems fair to conclude, affirm that the Department of Corrections is a "subordinate agency" for the purposes of the D.C. APA.
Several developments in other states with administrative procedure acts
not dissimilar from the D.C. APA lead to the same conclusion. The Governor of Oregon recently exempted that state's corrections division from the
Oregon Administrative Procedures Act, 1 22 which defines an "agency" in a
manner similar to the D.C. APA. 123 Moreover, other definitions and provisions in the Oregon APA are similar to those in the District of Columbia
Act. 1 24 In particular, the definition of the term "Rule" contains the following provisions:
"Rule" .

does not include:

(a) Internal management directives, regulations or statements be119. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 372, 376 (D. D.C. 1962).
120. Id. at 376.
121. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-402 (1967).
122.

In the Matter of the Application of the Corrections Division for an Exemption

Pursuant to ORS 193.315(4), 1 PRISON L. RPR. 356 (Sept. 6, 1972).
123. ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.310(1) (1971):
"Agency" means any state board, commission, department or division thereof,
or officer authorized by law to make rules or to issue orders, except those in
the legislative or judicial branches.
124. Compare ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.310(7) (1971) to D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502
(6) (1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.335(1) (1971) to D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1505(a)
(1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.390 (1971) to D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1505(b) (1972);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.415 (1971) to D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1509 (1972); and ORE.
REV. STAT. § 183.480 (1971) to D.C. CODE ANN. § 1510 (1972).
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tween agencies, or other officers or their employees, or within an

agency ....

125

Despite this provision, the Oregon Act was assumed to apply to the Oregon
Corrections Division, and the State had to resort to a statutory procedure in order to exempt certain aspects of the Division Operations.
In a second related development, a California Superior Court faced the
question of
whether or not the Administrative Procedure Act, Government Code
Section 11371 et. seq. applies to the rules and regulations of the
Director of Corrections and the Adult Authority. This Court has
126
concluded that the answer is in the affirmative.
The court expressly rejected the State's arguments that the legislature intended to exclude the department from the provisions of the Act, that "the
Director is not 'implementing, interpreting, or making specific the law enforced or administered by it' within the meaning of Government Code Section
11371(b) defining 'regulation' when he is discharging his statutory mandate to administer the prisons" and, finally, that the department's rules and
regulations constitute the "internal management" of the prison system which
is exempted by Section 11371(b). 127 In response to the first argument,
the court ruled that the provision in California's Penal Code 28 authorizing the
Director to prescribe and change rules and regulations "at his pleasure" was
not inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. "The Director may
prescribe rules and change them as long as he complies with the procedural
requirements of the Act and not be statutorily inconsistent. They are statutorily reconcilable.'1 29 The court summarily dismissed the state's second
argument, and in response to the third, held that many of the Director's actions implement laws which "do not concern internal management . . . but
. . . have a decided impact upon prisoners, parolee population and sou30
ciety in general.'
Although the action by the Governor of Oregon expressly exempting the
Corrections Division from the Oregon Administrative Procedure Act and the
125. ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.310(7) (1971). See text accompanying notes 28-31
infra.
126. American Friends Services Committee v. Procunier, No. 219108 (Sacramento
Cty., Calif. Sup. Ct., June 30, 1972), 1 PRISON L. RPTR. 249.
127. 1 PRISON L. RPTR. 249. Section 11371 provides as follows:
(b) "regulation" means every rule, regulation, order, or standard of general
application or the amendment, supplement or revision of any such rule, regulation order or standard adopted by any state agency to implement, interpret,
or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its
procedure except one which relates only to the internal management of the
State agencies.
128. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5058 (West 1970).
129. 1 PRIsON L. RPTR. 249.
130. Id.
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decision in American Friends Service Committee v. Procunier support
the proposition that such acts are applicable to correctional agencies,
both also raise the issue of the desirability of subjecting corrections departments to administrative procedure acts. The resolution of this issue depends largely on the practicability of conformity by such departments to
standard administrative procedures. At least two departments are already
statutorily required to adhere to the administrative procedure acts of their
respective states. In Pennsylvania, applicable statutes classify the Boards
of Trustees of various state institutions, which share institutional rule-making
authority with the Commissioner of Corrections, as "departmental administrative boards, commissions or offices." 13 1 Under Pennsylvania's recent
"Documents Law,"' 13 2 all "agencies", a term which includes "any departmental
administrative board or commission," 133 must give public notice of and request written comments on the proposed adoption or change of administrative regulations,' 3 4 must review and consider all submitted written comments,' 85 and may conduct public hearings.' 30 Pursuant to these provisions, the office of the Pennsylvania Commissioner of Corrections publishes
all institutional rules in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. 3 7 The department, however, avoids the statutory requirement of notice of the adoption of proposed
rules 3 8 by stating that the "regulations must become effective immediately
and that notice

. . .

is impractical .

.

. ,,l19

Unlike the Pennsylvania stat-

ute, the Florida corrections code requires the regulations of the Corrections
Division to be adopted pursuant to the State's Adminstrative Procedure Act.'
It appears that the Florida Corrections Division, like Pennsylvania's, avoids the
statutory rule-making procedure by declaring an emergency in every instance of the adoption of new rules, a gambit which allows the new rules to
take effect immediately. 41 ' Thus there has not been, to this date, any real
131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 62 (1962).
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 1101-1611 (Supp. 1972).
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 1102(3) (Supp. 1972).
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 1201 (Supp. 1972).
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 1202 (Supp. 1972).
136.

Id.

137. See, e.g., 1 Pa. Bulletin 1655 (Pa. B. Doe. No. 71-1614) (August 14, 1971);
1 Pa. Bulletin 1951 (Pa. B. Doe. No. 71-1964) (October 9, 1971); 1 Pa. Bulletin 2017
(Pa. B. Doc. No. 71-2040) (October 23, 1971); 2 Pa. Bulletin 60 (Pa. B. Doc. No.

72-111) (January 15, 1972); 2 Pa. Bulletin 1771 (Pa. B. Doc. No.. 72-1880) (September 23, 1972).
138. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 1201, 1202 (Supp. 1972).
139. See note 137 supra.
140. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 945.21(2) (1973).
141. See, e.g., Fla. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Certification of Administrative Rules Filed with the Secretary of State (Pursuant to Chapter
120, Florida Statutes), Rules 10B-0.29 through 1OB-0.36; Rules 1OB-0.44 through
10B-0.51; Rules 1B-037 through 1OB-0.43; Rules 1OB-0.22 through 10B-0.28; Rules

10B-0.12 through 10B-0.21; Rules 10B-0.68 through IOB-0.86.
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experience by which to evaluate the benefits or problems caused by correctional agency adherence to administrative procedure acts. The most that
can be said is that correctional agencies have not demonstrated any reason
for exemption from such acts.
The Mayor-Commissioner of the District of Columbia recently issued an
amendment to the Organization Order governing the Department of Corrections which raises, but fails to resolve, the question of the applicability of
the D.C. APA to the Department. The controlling Organization Order
formerly authorized the Director of the Department:
. . . [w]ith the approval of the District of Columbia Council . . .
to promulgate rules and regulations for administering the institutions
and facilities of the Department ....142
The Commissioner's Order of November 7,1972, amended this provision, as
follows:
The Director shall have power to promulgate rules and regulations for administering the institutions and facilities of the Department, subject to such approval by the District of Columbia
Council as required by Sections 402(213) and 402(426) of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967.143
This provision at least acknowledges the issue of the D.C. APA's applicability but otherwise appears to be a conscious effort to avoid its resolution.
Recognition of the applicability of administrative procedure acts to correctional agencies should have a substantial impact on their decision-making
processes and on the content of those decisions. Examination of the D.C.
Act provides a good example of what might be expected.
Like the federal APA,144 the D.C. Act requires publication in the District of Columbia Register of "the full text of all rules filed in the office of the
Commissioner. . .. ,145 Since October 21, 1969, agencies subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act must file every newly adopted rule inthe office of the Commissioner. 146 No rule becomes effective until it is published
by his office inthe D.C. Register.147 In addition, D.C. Code Ann. § 11506(a) (Supp. V, 1972) required each agency to file with the Commissioner, by November 21, 1969, a copy of all of its rules inforce on October
21, 1969. Although the statute is not perfectly clear, it does not appear that
the failure of any agency to file or publish its pre-October 21, 1969 rules
142. Government of the District of Columbia, Commissioner's Order No. 67-94
(December 26, 1967).
143. Government of the District of Columbia, Commissioner's Order No. 72-265
(November 7, 1972).
144. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (1967).
145. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1504(a) (Supp. V, 1972).
146. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1506(a) (Supp. V, 1972).
147. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1506(c) (Supp. V, 1972).
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invalidates those rules. The provision in subsection (c) that "no such rule
shall come effective until after its publication in the District of Columbia
Register . . ." applies only to newly adopted rules referred to in subsection
(c) and not existing rules referred to in subsection (a).
The D.C. Register contains no rules adopted or followed by the District of
Columbia Department of Corrections. Yet, since the fall of 1969 the Department and its institutions have adopted regulations governing such crucial
correctional matters as the disciplining of prisoners, 148 the censoring of residents' mail1 49 and the use of the maximum security, solitary confinement and
isolation.' 5 Each of these departmental orders is presumably invalid.' 5 '
This conclusion has serious implications for the entire range of the Department's activities, but two examples from the area of the disciplining of residents who have allegedly violated institutional rules of conduct will serve
to illustrate. First, since all of the disciplinary actions which the Department's
various institutions have taken on the basis of its regulations are invalid, the
department is unauthorized to continue any disciplinary sanctions, such as
segregation, which are at this moment in force, except to the extent that it
can "re-try" those residents who have been disciplined pursuant to new disciplinary regulations validly adopted as discussed below. Moreover, the
affected inmates are entitled to have these proceedings expunged from their
institutional records, including those which are forwarded to the District of
Columbia Parole Board and those which are maintained at the institution and
are now affecting the resident's classification for such matters as housing and
institutional programs and privileges\
Second, the Department has no authority to continue to discipline residents until its regulations are validly adopted. This particular issue should
not cause a great deal of trouble since
if, in an emergency, as determined by the Commissioner or
Council or an independent agency, the adoption of a rule is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health,
safety, welfare, or morals, the Commissioner or Council or such
independent agency may adopt such rules as may be necessary in
the circumstances, and such rule may become effective immediately.
Any such emergency rule shall forthwith be published and filed in
the manner prescribed in section 1-1506. No such rule shall re148. District of Columbia Department of Corrections, Departmental Order 5300.6
(May 17, 1971).
149. District of Columbia Department of Corrections, Lorton Correctional Complex, Superintendent's Order 1200 (May 5, 1971).
150. See note 148, supra.
151. Cf. Junghans v. Dept. of Human Resources of the District of Columbia, 289
A.2d 17, 25, 27 (D.C. 1972).
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main in effect longer
than one hundred and twenty days after the
152
date of its adoption.
Prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule by any subordinate
agency,153 the D.C. Council must publish notice of the intended action in the
Register at least thirty days before the proposed effective date "so as to afford interested persons opportunity to submit data and views either orally
or in writing, as may be specified in such notice."' 154 Moreover, any interested person 15 may petition the Council for the promulgation, amendment, or
appeal of any rule by a subordinate agency, and the Council must prescribe
a general procedure for the "submission, consideration, and disposition" of
such requests.' 50 The D.C. APA also authorizes the Council or any
agency to issue at its discretion and upon petition of any interested person
"a declaratory order with respect to the applicability of any rule or statute
enforcible by them or by it, to terminate a controversy (other than a contested case) or to remove uncertainty." A declaratory order is binding between the agency and the petitioner. Each agency must "prescribe by rule
the form for such petitions and the procedure for their submission, consideration and disposition." A declaratory order is subject to the same judicial
review as contested cases, but the refusal of the agency to issue a declara57
tory order is not reviewable.'
The rule-making and declaratory order sections of the D.C. APA are
central to the concept and purpose of any administrative procedure act and
to the importance of bringing the D.C. Department of Corrections into conformity with the local Act. The comments of the Third Circuit in Texaco,
Inc. v. FederalPower Commission,'"8 regarding the intended effect of the corresponding rule-making provision in the Federal APA, are universally applicable:
[The rule making provision] was enacted to give the public an
opportunity to participate in the rule-making process. It also
enables the agency promulgating the rules to educate itself before
152. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1505(c) (Supp.V, 1972).
153. A "rule" is defined in D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502(b) (1970) as: . . . "[T]he
whole or any part of any Commissioner's, Council's, or agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of
the Commissioner .. "
154. D.C.CODE ANN. § 1-1505(a) (Supp. V, 1972).
155. The Act does not define "interested person". There are no District of
Columbia APA cases on this issue. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502(9) (1970) provides
that "person" includes "individuals . . . associations, and public or private organizations of any character other than the Commissioner, the Council, or an agency."
156. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1505(b) (Supp.V, 1972).
157. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1508 (Supp. V, 1972). -158. 412 F.2d 740 (3rd Cir. 1969).
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establishing rules and procedures which have a substantial impact
on those regulated. 15 9
It is now generally recognized that corrections has not received adequate
public and governmental inspection, review, regulation, and analysis, not to
mention support. 160 Indeed, the authors can clearly recall numerous lamentations by corrections personnel at all levels about the lack of public interest
and support in the correctional function. Unfortunately the all-too-frequent
response of many systems (although certainly not of the D.C. Department
of Corrections) to the sharply increased concern of the public with corrections has been a paranoid and even bitter withdrawal from and resistance
to the questions, criticisms, and advice of "outsiders." This traditional,
self-protective bureaucratic reaction is particularly inappropriate in administrative agencies that process difficult human beings and that, to date, have
not done so very successfully. Indeed such a reaction underscores the need
for traditional administrative rule-making processes. In Washington, D.C.,
and similar areas with bar associations actively involved in community affairs,
public participation in correctional rule-making should be of substantial scope
and should result in thoughtful and significant input into the correctional system. It also goes without saying that the traditional administrative rule-making process offers a convenient means of involving inmates in the development of correctional programs and policies, a practice which is now recognized as having beneficial rehabilitative and organizational impact.' 6 ' Concentrated efforts in several correctional systems by active bar associations and
other interested organizations are likely to have a substantial effect on the
procedures and contents of the rules and regulations of correctional systems
throughout the nation.
The D.C. APA also provides a more or less standard procedure for the
second major aspect of administrative procedure, adjudication of "contested
cases." A "contested case" is defined as
[A] proceeding before the Commissioner, the Council, or any agency
in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties
are required by any law (other than this Act), or by constitutional right, to be determined after a hearing before the Commissioner or the Council or before an agency, but shall not include
159. Id. at 744.
160. Bagdikian, Behind Bars, The Washington Post, March 24, 1972, § A, at 26,

col. 10:
Prisons are maintained by the public; and what goes on inside them is the
public's business. They are most likely to be operated in the public interest
if they are open, without more restriction than may be required for the public
safety, to unshackled public scrutiny.
161. PRESmENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF

JusTicE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, 50 (1967).
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(A) any matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the
facts de novo in any court; . . .and (D) cases in which the Commissioner, Council, or an agency act as an agent for a court of the
District .... 162
Section 1-1509 provides in any contested case for reasonable notice, for representation by counsel, for submission of "oral and documentary evidence,"
and for "such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." The burden of proof is on the proponent of the order' 6 3 but is not otherwise defined.'0
Agency decisions can be based
only on the official record.' 6 5
From the point of view of many inmates, the most important "contested
cases" at the prison are the disciplinary hearings conducted in instances of
alleged violations of prison conduct rules. These hearings constitute classic
adjudications as the administrative law field defines them.' 6 6 The nearly
universal procedure consists of a hearing conducted by a panel of three to
five institutional officials drawn from administrative, treatment and correctional personnel. This panel hears evidence in the presence of the accused inmate, sometimes allows the inmate to make a statement and
reaches a decision, out of the inmate's presence, as to his guilt or innocence
and, if guilty, the appropriate disposition. 167 The disciplinary sanctions imposed as a result of such hearings fall squarely within the definition of sanctions in the Administrative Procedure Act:
. . .the term "sanction" includes the whole or part of any Commissioner's or Council's or agency (A) prohibition, requirement,
limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of any person; 168 . . . (C) imposition of any form of penalty or fine; 69
70
(D) destruction, taking, seizure, or withholding of property;
(E) assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, costs, charges, or fees; 1772' . . . and (G) taking of other
compulsory or restrictive action.1
162. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502(8) (Supp. V, 1972).
163. An "order" is defined as "the whole or any part of the final disposition."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502(11) (Supp. V, 1972).
164. Nor are there any local cases dealing with this issue.
165. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1509(c) (Supp. V, 1972).
166. DAVIS 184: "Adjudication is the part of the administrative process that
resembles a court's decision of a case."
167.

AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL AsSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS,

408-10 (1966).
168. E.g., transfer to segregation or isolation; cancellation of furlough privileges,
work release program, or half-way house assignment.
169. E.g., loss of wages, loss of industrial or statutory good time, assessment for
"destruction of governmental property."
170. E.g., forfeiture of inmate's radio, seizure or destruction of clothes.
171. See note 169, supra.

172. See note 168, supra; D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502(16) (Supp. 1972).

See also

1973]

Correctional Legislation

Thus prison disciplinary hearings are arguably subject to the "contested
case" provisions of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act' 73if
these hearings are "required by any law . . .or by constitutional right.'

After the past three years of intensive prisoner rights/prison reform litigation,
there can be no doubt that a prisoner must be accorded at least a rudimentary hearing before being punished for alleged rule infractions. The only
dispute now is over the extent to which various hearing procedures and safe174
guards must be provided in the prison context. Even Sostre v. McGinnis
an important case which is considered by many prisoners' rights advocates to
be a major setback, held that under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment a prisoner must at least be given notice of the charges against
him, a hearing on the charges, and the opportunity to speak in his own defense. 17 5 Other cases have concluded that some or all prison disciplinary
proceedings require such additional "trial-like" procedural safeguards as the
right to be confronted by one's accuser, the ability to cross-examine one's
accuser and other witnesses and to present one's own witnesses, and the right
to legal representation or lay assistance. 176 And for the past year, the District of Columbia Jail, a unit of the D.C. Department of Corrections, has been
under court order to provide "an immediate administrative hearing" to inmates accused of disciplinary infractions; at such hearings inmates are entitled to legal or lay representation. 17 7 Adherence to the contested case
at least the discipliprovisions of the D.C. A.P.A. 17 , would have avoided
79
nary procedures aspect of the Campbell litigation.'
5 U.S.C. § 551(10) (1967).
173. D.C.CODE ANN.§ 1-1502(8) (Supp.V, 1972).
174. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
175. Id. at 198.
176. See, e.g., cases cited in note 17, supra.
177. Campbell v. Rodgers (Civil No. 1462-71 pending, D. D.C.) Amended Consent
Order, January 11, 1972.
In his Order partially exempting the Oregon Corrections Division from the Oregon
Administrative Procedures Act, note 129-132 and accompanying text, supra, the Governor rules that the Division disciplinary proceedings need not adhere to the APA's
contested case provisions if other, similar provisions, which the Order expressly detailed, were adopted. The Order did not exempt the adoption of "rules whose violation could result in major disciplinary sanctions" from the rule-making provisions of
the State's APA.
178. See text accompanying notes 164-166, supra.
179. See Goldsby v. Carnes, Civ. No. 20122-1 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 1973) where the
defendants, city and jail officials agreed that in disciplinary proceedings:
Appeals from any final decision of the Director of Health and Welfare
shall be to the Circuit Court of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit in accordance
with the provisions of the Missouri A.P.A., Chapter 536 of the Revised
Statutes of the State of Missouri and Article V, Section 22 of the Missouri
Constitution.
The authors were co-counsel for plaintiffs in this case.
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Conclusion

There are, then, strong arguments for what would appear to be the obvious
(in almost any situation but the closed and often irrational world that has
been American corrections). The Federal and the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Acts govern those jurisdictions' correctional agencies.
The type of analysis made of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act and
the statutes relating to the United States Bureau of Prisons, and, in more
detail, of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act and the statutes relating to the D.C. Department of Corrections will, if repeated, result
in the same conclusions regarding other correctional systems and the parole
boards of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the several states.
The ideal resolution of the question would be definitive actions by the legislatures setting forth whether standard administrative procedures apply to the
various correctional functions. It is far more likely, unfortunately, that the
legislatures will ignore or duck this particular issue as they have the entire
correctional field, with the sad result that corrections-the authorities
and the clients-will continue to be deprived of the important benefits of
the American administrative process. We suspect that the best that can result from an article such as this will be yet another wave of litigation on
top of the flood of prisoner rights/prison reform cases already inundating the
courts. That is not a very happy prospect for anyone.

